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The perceived speed of moving objects has long been known to depend on image contrast. Lowering the
contrast of ﬁrst-order motion stimuli typically decreases perceived speed – the well-known ‘‘Thompson
effect’’. It has been suggested that contrast-dependent biases are the result of optimal inference by the
visual system, whereby unreliable sensory information is combined with prior beliefs. The Thompson
effect is thought to result from the prior belief that objects move slowly (in Bayesian terminology, a ‘‘slow
speed prior’’). However, there is some evidence that the Thompson effect is attenuated or even reversed
at higher speeds. Does the effect of contrast on perceived speed depend on absolute speed and what does
this imply for Bayesian models with a slow speed prior? We asked subjects to compare the speeds of
simultaneously presented drifting gratings of different contrasts. At low contrasts (3–15%), we found that
the Thompson effect was attenuated at high speeds: at 8 and 12 deg/s, perceived speed increased less
with contrast than at 1 and 4 deg/s; however, at higher contrasts (15–95%), the situation was reversed.
A semi-parametric Bayesian model was used to extract the subjects’ speed priors and was subsequently
improved by combining it with a model of speed tuning. These novel ﬁndings regarding the dual, con-
trast-dependent effect of high speeds help reconcile existing conﬂicting literature and suggest that phys-
iologically plausible mechanisms of representation of speed in the visual cortex may need to be
incorporated into Bayesian models to account for certain subtleties of human speed perception.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Perception has long been known to be susceptible to illusions
and biases. Research on visual motion perception in particular
has revealed several types of those illusions and biases, such as
motion-induced blindness (Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi, 2001;
Ramachandran et al., 1991), a preference for cardinal directions
(Rauber & Treue, 1998; the motion equivalent of the oblique effect,
Appelle, 1972), illusory ‘‘inﬁnite regress’’ (Tse & Hsieh, 2006) and
the dependence of perceived speed on stimulus contrast
(Blakemore & Snowden, 1999; Hawken, Gegenfurtner, & Tang,
1994; Hürlimann, Kiper, & Carandini, 2002; Stocker & Simoncelli,
2006; Stone & Thompson, 1992; Thompson, 1982; Thompson,
Stone, & Swash, 1996, among others). The effect of contrast on
perceived speed has been extensively studied in both ﬁrst (Brooks,
2001; Hawken, Gegenfurtner, & Tang, 1994; Hürlimann, Kiper, &
Carandini, 2002; Stone & Thompson, 1992; Thompson, 1982) and
second-order (Ledgeway & Smith, 1995) motion; in luminance-
based and color-based (Cavanagh, Tyler, & Favreau, 1984; Hawken,Gegenfurtner, & Tang, 1994) motion; using narrowband (Müller &
Greenlee, 1994; Thompson, 1982; Thompson, Brooks, & Hammett,
2006) and broadband (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999; Stocker &
Simoncelli, 2006) artiﬁcial (such as gratings) as well as natural
stimuli (such as a virtual environment simulating the viewpoint
of a driver of a road vehicle Snowden, Stimpson, & Ruddle, 1998).
The majority of these studies have found that decreases in contrast
cause decreases in perceived speed: a high-contrast stimulus mov-
ing at the same speed as a low-contrast one appears faster.
While the effect of contrast on speed could be a limitation or an
artifact of the visual system, several researchers propose that this
(and other) biases may in fact be the result of optimal inference
by the visual system in the face of uncertainty and internal and/
or external noise. In particular, it has been suggested that percep-
tion can be thought of as unconscious inference whereby incom-
plete or noisy sensory information is combined with internal
expectations and thus disambiguated. If these expectations match
the statistics of the environment, perception is optimal, in the
sense that it is the best guess about the immediate external world.
This old idea (von Helmholtz, 1962) has been used to explain var-
ious phenomena in motion perception. For example, in order to ex-
plain his ﬁndings on the so-called aperture problem, Wallach
postulated that the visual system expects objects to move slowly
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tion as unconscious inference has recently been formulated into
the ‘‘Bayesian brain’’ hypothesis (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Ma, Beck,
Latham, & Pouget, 2006), according to which the brain represents
prior probabilities (expectations) and likelihoods (sensory input)
and combines them into posterior distributions (percept) accord-
ing to Bayes’ rule. In this framework, Wallach’s intuition is formal-
ized by assuming a prior probability distribution that favors slow
speeds. Such a prior has been successfully employed to explain a
multitude of phenomena in motion perception (Bogadhi et al.,
2011; Hedges, Stocker, & Simoncelli, 2011; Hürlimann, Kiper, &
Carandini, 2002; Montagnini, Mamassian, Perrinet, Castet, & Mas-
son, 2007; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Weiss & Adelson, 1998;
Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002), including the decrease in per-
ceived speed as contrast decreases: at low contrasts, the sensory
evidence is weak (the likelihood function is broader than at high
contrasts) and therefore the inﬂuence of the prior on the ﬁnal
speed estimate (the mean or mode of the posterior distribution)
is stronger.
However, a small number of studies have presented evidence
for the opposite effect: in certain cases, low contrast results in an
increase in perceived speed. In these studies, subjects are asked
to match the speed of two drifting gratings of different contrasts
presented either simultaneously or sequentially. The ratio of the
actual speeds of the high- and low-contrast grating at the point
of subjective equality (PSE) will be less than 1 if low contrast de-
creases perceived speed (the high-contrast grating will have to
move more slowly in order to have the same apparent speed).
Thompson (1982) found that this ratio was indeed less than 1 for
temporal frequencies below 8 Hz; above that, the ratio becomes
greater than 1 and contrast has the opposite effect. By conducting
his experiment at a variety of spatial frequencies, he concluded
that this ‘‘null point’’ is invariant with temporal frequency and
not speed (which is the ratio of temporal to spatial frequency):
regardless of the spatial frequency used, the null point was at
8 Hz. In a later study however, Stone and Thompson (1992) could
not replicate this switchover at 8 Hz: in all cases, lower contrast re-
sulted in lower perceived speed. They speculated that their earlier
result was a methodological artifact (subjects making judgments
other than on speed), supported by the observation that the task
became very difﬁcult at high temporal frequencies. In an attempt
to settle the issue, Thompson, Brooks, and Hammett (2006) per-
formed a similar experiment and found evidence for a null point;
however, it was invariant in neither temporal frequency nor speed:
at a spatial frequency of 2 cycles/deg, the null point was 6–8 Hz
(i.e. at a speed of 3–4 deg/s) whereas at a spatial frequency of 8 cy-
cles/deg, the null point was 10–14 Hz (or 1.25–1.75 deg/s). Mean-
while, data from other labs also suggested the existence of a null
point at 8 Hz (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999; Hawken, Gegenfurt-
ner, & Tang, 1994). Both studies used 1 cycle/deg gratings, corre-
sponding to a speed of 8 deg/s. At this rate of movement, low
contrast slightly increased perceived speed for all four subjected
tested by Hawken, Gegenfurtner, and Tang (1994), whereas Blake-
more and Snowden (1999) only found this to be the case in one of
the three subjects tested, although in another subject judgments
were more veridical (low contrast did decrease perceived speed
but less so).
Despite the wealth of data on the effect of contrast on perceived
speed, the issue is not satisfactorily resolved. Is this effect a func-
tion of speed? For Bayesian models that assume a monotonically
decreasing speed prior, a null point would prove problematic as
it would imply a prior that increases beyond that point, at higher
speeds. Can such a prior be recovered from human subjects? Fur-
thermore, if the null point were invariant to temporal frequency
and not speed, the role of a stimulus-independent speed prior for
predictions would be limited.To address these questions, we performed a speed matching
experiment very similar to that by Thompson, Brooks, and Ham-
mett (2006) using more subjects, each providing a larger number
of PSE measurements than in previous studies. Experimental
parameters were similar to those used in existing literature in or-
der to allow direct comparisons. Using the Bayesian model of
Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), we also extracted the priors and
likelihood widths of our subjects. Furthermore, we explored the
‘‘ratio model’’ put forth by Thompson, Brooks, and Hammett
(2006) as a non-Bayesian alternative that explains their null point
ﬁndings. We found that the ratio model alone cannot account for
our data but a combination of the Bayesian and ratio model offers
an improvement over the Bayesian model alone.2. Psychophysical experiment
2.1. Methods
Six subjects participated in a 5-day experiment similar to Stock-
er and Simoncelli (2006): a 2-AFC task where subjects were asked
to compare the speeds of two drifting gratings, a reference and a
test one, that were presented on a Samsung 2043BW LCD monitor
on either side of a central ﬁxation point on a uniform midgray
background. Each grating was viewed through a circular aperture
of 3 degrees of visual angle in diameter. The aperture centers were
6 deg to the left and right of the ﬁxation point. The speed of the ref-
erence grating was held constant in each condition tested while
the speed of the test grating was adjusted through a QUEST stair-
case procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983) until the gratings appeared
to move at the same speed. Each staircase terminated after 35 tri-
als, at which point the best (the mode of the posterior pdf of the
QUEST algorithm) estimate of the speed of the test grating at the
point of subjective equality (PSE) was recorded. The position
(left/right) of the reference grating varied randomly but was kept
ﬁxed throughout a single staircase (to minimize adaptation ef-
fects). The spatial frequency of the gratings was ﬁxed at 2 cycles/
deg – the lowest of the two values used by Thompson, Brooks,
and Hammett (2006) (2 and 8 cycles/deg). Gratings had one of 3
contrast levels (3%, 15%, 95% Michelson contrast). The reference
grating had one of 4 speeds (1, 4, 8 and 12 deg/s). Each condition
corresponded to a unique combination of (reference and test) con-
trasts and reference grating speeds. Thus there were 12 conditions
in total: 3 contrast level pairs (3%/15%, 3%/95% and 15%/95% for ref-
erence/test grating, respectively) times 4 reference speeds. 6 of
these conditions – the ones corresponding to the lowest two
speeds 1 and 4 deg/s – were grouped in a block of 420 trials in to-
tal. The remaining conditions – corresponding to the highest two
speeds – were grouped in a block of 1680 trials. Thus in each of
the 5 sessions, each subject performed 2 staircases for each condi-
tion in the low-speed block and 8 staircases for each condition in
the high-speed block. Each trial started with a 200 ms ﬁxation per-
iod where only the ﬁxation point was visible, followed by a 500 ms
stimulus presentation, followed by a response period in which the
screen was blank (gray) until the subject pressed the left or right
arrow on the keyboard to indicate which of the two gratings ap-
peared to be moving faster. Subjects were offered an optional short
break every 10 min into the experiment and a mandatory 5-min
break every 20 min. The total duration of a session (day) was
approximately 1 h.
The reason that high-speed trials were presented 4 times more
often is twofold. First, previous research as well as pilot data indi-
cated that speed judgments are harder at speeds above 8 deg/s and
thus there is more variability in subject responses (Stocker &
Simoncelli, 2006; Stone & Thompson, 1992), therefore more data
is necessary to obtain an accurate estimate. Second, by presenting
18 G. Sotiropoulos et al. / Vision Research 97 (2014) 16–23high speeds more often, we wished to examine whether the prior
favoring slow speeds would gradually change to accommodate
the stimulus statistics – i.e. moving some probability mass towards
higher speeds, in a similar fashion to our previous work (Sotiropo-
ulos, Seitz, & Seriès, 2011).
2.2. Results
We analyzed the PSE threshold from each staircase and report
the average PSEs for each condition of each day in Fig. 2.1. Since
in each trial the reference grating had a lower contrast than the
test grating, we will refer to the latter as the ‘‘high contrast’’ grat-
ing. If lower contrast results in higher perceived speed, the ratio of
speeds of the high and low-contrast grating (hereafter referred to
as contrast-dependent bias – CDB) should be greater than one (be-
cause the high-contrast grating would have to move faster in order
to appear as fast as the low-contrast one).
We ﬁrst examined whether there was any notable effect of
experience on CDB. A 3-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
CDB with factors session number, contrast condition and reference
speed showed that session had an effect on CDB ðp < 0:04Þ in all
but one subject. Data from two subjects that exhibited the highest
effect of session is shown in Supplementary Fig. 1. However, the ef-
fect of session was nonspeciﬁc and nonmonotonic: there was no
consistent change in CDB across sessions and certainly not an in-
crease towards unity. Furthermore, when only the trials with the
lowest two reference speeds are considered (where one would ex-
pect the greatest effect of exposure to the more frequent high
speeds, as in Sotiropoulos, Seitz, and Seriès (2011)), ANOVAs on
individual subjects’ data failed to show an effect of session
ðp > 0:1Þ except in one subject (where F4;30 ¼ 3:59; p ¼ 0:017Þ.
Therefore we concluded that there was no consistent perceptual
change and thus data from all sessions was pooled, providing a rich
data set for subsequent analysis and modeling.
We then examined whether CDB differed as a function of refer-
ence speed. Unlike in some previous reports, CDB did not exceed
unity in the majority of subjects and conditions; the only exception
was one subject (S5) at the lowest contrasts (3% and 15%) and high-
est speed (12 deg/s), although CDB was not signiﬁcantly different
from unity ðt39 ¼ 1:62, p ¼ 0:114, two-tailed t-test). In all other
cases, CDB was less than one, meaning that lowering contrast re-
sulted in a decrease in perceived speed. In other words, apart from
the aforementioned single case, there was no ‘‘null point’’ – a result
that conﬂicts with that of Thompson, Brooks, and Hammett (2006).
It is worth noting the variability across subjects, especially with
regards to the effect of contrast difference on perceived speed.
Furthermore, when data from all subjects is pooled, there is a
tendency towards more veridical perception as speed increases1 4 8 12
0
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1
v H
C/
v L
C
Ref speed (deg/s)
LC = 3%, HC = 15%
1 4
0
0.5
1
1.51.5
Ref spee
LC = 3%,
Fig. 2.1. Mean ratio of speeds of the high ðvHCÞ and low-contrast ðvLCÞ gratings at the p
contrast condition. Colored points represent individual subjects; black points represent
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to thin the lowest-contrasts condition, seen as the positive slope of
the black line in the leftmost panel of Fig. 2.1. However, the
opposite tendency is seen in the highest-contrasts condition (neg-
ative slope of the black line in rightmost panel of Fig. 2.1). The
aforementioned 3-way ANOVA showed that there is a marginally
signiﬁcant effect of speed alone ðF3;1440 ¼ 2:77; p ¼ 0:0402Þ but a
highly signiﬁcant interaction effect of speed and contrast condition
ðF6;1440 ¼ 9:11; p < 0:0001Þ.
In summary, at contrasts below 15%, our results are in qualita-
tive agreement with the ﬁnding of Hawken, Gegenfurtner, and
Tang (1994) that as reference speed increased, the effect of con-
trast on perceived speed diminished and in one case even reversed.
However, our results at higher contrasts (where both gratings had
contrasts at least 15%) show the opposite effect: as reference speed
increased, low contrast decreased perceived speed even more
strongly.
3. Modeling
3.1. Methods
To model the relationship between perceived and actual speed
under various contrasts and reference speeds and to extract the
priors and likelihoods of our subjects, we used the Bayesian model
of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006). Brieﬂy, in each trial, an ideal ob-
server computes estimates of the speed of each grating and
chooses the grating that has a higher estimated speed. Perceived
speed is assumed to be the mode of the posterior probability den-
sity function (pdf) that results from the combination of prior and
likelihood. The functional form of the prior is log-linear:
pðvÞ ¼ expðav þ bÞ ð3:1Þ
a is the local slope of the logarithm of the prior: the log-prior is
approximated by a straight line within a narrow speed range but
the slope a varies with speed across larger scales (such as across
points on a log scale). To reﬂect the dependence of the slope on
speed, we will hereafter denote it by aðvÞ. The likelihood is Gauss-
ian with mean equal to the true stimulus speed and width (standard
deviation) separable in speed and contrast:
rðv ; cÞ ¼ gðvÞhðcÞ ð3:2Þ
where the dependence on contrast, hðcÞ, obeys a physiologically
motivated inverse power law (Sclar, Maunsell, & Lennie, 1990;
Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006):
hðcÞ ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
cq
cqþcq50
rmax þ rbase
q ð3:3Þ8 12
d (deg/s)
 HC = 95%
1 4 8 12
0
0.5
1
1.5
Ref speed (deg/s)
LC = 15%, HC = 95%
oint of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, separately for each
the combined data from all subjects. Error bars are standard error of the mean. (For
e web version of this article.)
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Gaussian with mean and variance
Eðv^Þ ¼ v þ aðvÞr2ðv; cÞ ð3:4Þ
Varðv^Þ ¼ r2ðv ; cÞ ð3:5Þ
where v is the true stimulus speed, aðvÞ is the slope of the logarithm
of the prior around v and r is the standard deviation of the likeli-
hood function, which depends on both speed and contrast. The term
aðvÞr2ðv ; cÞ is the prior-induced bias of the estimated speed.
The model contains 10 free parameters: 4 for each of aðvÞ and
gðvÞ (which are not assumed to be any particular function of
speed and thus require one parameter for each reference speed
used in the experiment) and 2 for hðcÞ. With 10 free parameters,
optimization is not trivial and local minima cannot be avoided
entirely. Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) exploit the trial-to-trial
variability in the data to sufﬁciently constrain their model by
assuming that in each trial the observer samples from the two
posterior pdfs and chooses the stimulus whose sample has the
highest speed value. They thus derive an expression for the psy-
chometric function
pðv^2 > v^1Þ ¼
Z 1
0
pðv^2jv2Þ
Z v^2
0
pðv^1jv1Þdv^1dv^2 ð3:6Þ
where v^1; v^2 are the estimated speeds of the two gratings (reference
and test). Eq. (3.6) is ﬁt to the entire dataset via a maximum-likeli-
hood procedure.
We adopt a different, computationally cheaper, approach: given
the PSE for a particular condition, the means of the posterior for
each grating are equal and thus from Eq. (3.4):
v1 þ aðv1Þr2ðv1; c1Þ ¼ v2 þ aðv2Þr2ðv2; c2Þ ð3:7Þ
Since v is known for both gratings, aðvÞ; gðvÞ and hðcÞ can be ﬁt to
the data but because aðvÞ and rðv ; cÞ appear in a product in Eq.
(3.4), there are no unique best-ﬁt values for them, i.e. the model
is not sufﬁciently constrained as it is. However, our data consists
of multiple staircases for each condition and the staircase-to-stair-
case variability can be exploited to constrain the model. In each
session, there are 2 staircases for each of the low reference speeds
and 8 for each of the high reference speeds. Since session number
did not have a consistent observable effect on speed perception,
data can be pooled, yielding 10 staircases for each of the low-
speed conditions and 40 for each of the high-speed conditions.
The squared standard error (equivalent to sample variance) r2PSE
of the PSE across the 10 (or 40) staircases is informative: it can
be shown to be proportional to the variance of the distribution
of the test speed v2 at the PSE and inversely proportional to the
number of trials in a single staircase (see Appendix A.3). The pdf
of the distribution of v2 (conditioned on the reference speed v1
and the fact that v^1 ¼ v^2 at the PSE) is Gaussian with variance
equal to the sum of variances of the likelihoods of the two grat-
ings. In particular (see Appendix A.1):
pðv2jv1; v^1 ¼ v^2Þ  N ðv1 þ aðv1Þðr21  r22Þ;r21 þ r22Þ ð3:8Þ
where rðv1; c1Þ is written as r1 to reduce clutter. Thus the following
equation holds:
r2PSE ¼ a
r21 þ r22
N
ð3:9Þ
where N is the number of trials in a staircase (40 throughout our
experiment) and a is a constant of proportionality. By comparing
our ﬁtting method against that of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006),
using an independent large dataset (21 subjects) obtained with an
identical stimulus and task conﬁguration and staircase procedure
(Berbec, 2013, see Appendix A.2), a was found approximately equal
to 6.6. Eq. (3.9) thus becomesr2PSE ¼
r21 þ r22
6
ð3:10Þ
Using Eqs. (3.7) and (3.10), the model was ﬁt with a least-
squares procedure (lsqnonlin function, MATLAB). The (unnor-
malized) priors were reconstructed as in Stocker and Simoncelli
(2006), by numerical integration of the ﬁtted local slope values,
according to the following equation (see Appendix A.4 for a
derivation):
pðvÞ ¼ exp
Z
aðvÞdv
 
ð3:11Þ
where aðvÞ (the slope as a function of speed) was linearly interpo-
lated using the slope values at the 4 reference speeds. The maxi-
mum and baseline ﬁring rates ðrmax and rbaseÞ in Eq. (3.3) were set
to 1 and 0.2, respectively.
3.2. Results
The Bayesian model ﬁts the data reasonably well; however, as
seen in Fig. 3.1, the model is unable to capture the differential ef-
fect of speed on CDB (the interaction between contrast condition
and speed described in Section 2.2). This is most evident with sub-
ject S5 (magenta triangles), who shows the strongest interaction
effect: the model ﬁt is satisfactory in the last two contrast condi-
tions (middle and rightmost panels of Fig. 3.1) but not in the ﬁrst
contrast condition (leftmost panel of Fig. 3.1).
The extracted priors and likelihood widths (Fig. 3.2) are quanti-
tatively similar to Stocker and Simoncelli (2006). The biggest dif-
ference is in the values of gðvÞ, which are somewhat lower for all
our subjects, compared to the two representative subjects shown
in Fig. 4 of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006); however, gðvÞ and hðcÞ
always appear in a product (Eq. (3.2)) and therefore there is no un-
ique set of values for either of these functions – in other words,
there is some degeneracy in the likelihood model. Discrepancies
between our extracted components and those of Stocker and
Simoncelli (2006) may also be due to the small differences in the
stimuli (mainly the different trial duration and spatial bandwidth
of the gratings) between our experiment and that of Stocker and
Simoncelli (2006). It is also interesting to note the differences in
extracted priors among subjects. In particular, S5 exhibits a much
shallower prior than S3. Finally, as in Stocker and Simoncelli
(2006), the priors for some subjects (S1 and S5) tend to ﬂatten at
the lowest and highest speeds.
The Bayesian model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) provides
a reasonable ﬁt to the data ðR2 ¼ 0:78; SSE ¼ 0:354Þ but fails to
account for the observed interaction effect: in the model, the ef-
fect of speed on the ratio v^HC=v^LC is qualitatively the same across
all contrasts conditions. For example, if the ratio increases with
speed in one contrast condition, then it has to also increase in
the other contrast conditions. This is because the same prior is
used across all contrasts. Clearly, the model needs to be modiﬁed
to account for the interaction. One approach is the use of a dif-
ferent speed prior depending on contrast level: a prior for high-
contrast stimuli that has a smaller slope at low speeds than the
prior for low-contrast stimuli (and vice versa at high speeds).
However, there is no good theoretical or empirical justiﬁcation
for such a non-parsimonious approach and its many necessary
assumptions.
Another approach is to model the interaction at the level of the
speed measurement, which corresponds to the likelihood mean in
the Bayesian model. In particular, an interaction effect would be
possible if the average value of the speed measurements depended
on the physical stimulus speed and contrast in a nonlinear fashion,
such as through a product. One possible choice of such a nonlinear-
ity would be the modiﬁcation of Eq. (3.4) to
1 4 8 12
0
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1
1.5
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C/
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C
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LC = 3%, HC = 15%
1 4 8 12
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LC = 3%, HC = 95%
1 4 8 12
0
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1.5
Ref speed (deg/s)
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Fig. 3.1. Mean ratio of speeds of the high ðvHCÞ and low-contrast ðvLCÞ gratings at the point of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, separately for each
contrast condition. Points represent experimental data (as in Fig. 2.1); lines represent predictions of the ﬁtted Bayesian model. Color represents individual subjects; black
represents the combined data from all subjects. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 3.2. Extracted prior (left panel); speed-dependent gðvÞ (middle panel) and contrast-dependent hðcÞ (right panel) components of likelihood width rðv ; cÞ in the Bayesian
model. Colored curves are individual subjects; black curves are all subjects combined. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
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where f ðv; cÞ is no longer the true stimulus speed but a nonlinear
function of true speed and contrast. Such a nonlinearity has been
proposed by opponents of Bayesian models of speed perception in
an attempt to explain the speed-dependent effect of contrast on
perceived speed (Thompson, Brooks, & Hammett, 2006). In their
‘‘ratio model’’, itself an extension of theWeighted Intersection Mod-
el (WIM) of Perrone and Thiele (2002), perceived speed is given by
the ratio of a low-pass and a band-pass temporal ﬁlter. Since these
ﬁlters were originally proposed to model speed tuning as a result of
motion-sensitive neurons in V1, it is natural to apply them at an
earlier stage than the Bayesian computations (thought to be carried
out in area MT, Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). Such an early stage nat-
urally corresponds to modifying the actual stimulus speed used as
input to the Bayesian model – that is, modifying the mean of the
likelihood.
The two ﬁlters proposed by Thompson, Brooks, and Hammett
(2006), low-pass and band-pass, are inseparable functions of tem-
poral frequency ðxÞ and contrast (c) and their responses are given,
respectively, by:
pðx; cÞ ¼ pðxÞc
pðxÞc þ sp
mðx; cÞ ¼ mðxÞc
mðxÞc þ sm
withpðxÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a2 þ b2
q
mðxÞ ¼ x
k
pðxÞ
a ¼ ðð2pxs1Þ2 þ 1Þ
9=2
b ¼ ðð2pxs2Þ2 þ 1Þ
10=2
s1 and s2 are time constants, and sp and sm are semi-saturation con-
stants of the ﬁlters. Perceived speed, as a function of temporal fre-
quency and contrast, is then given by
vðx; cÞ ¼ mðx; cÞ
pðx; cÞ ð3:13Þ
Eq. (3.13) thus provides the nonlinearity f ðv ; cÞ used in Eq. (3.12).
To avoid adding new free parameters to the model, we used a
nested optimization procedure to ﬁnd the best-ﬁtting values for
these parameters and ﬁxed them across all subjects and conditions
before ﬁtting the parameters of the Bayesian model. We found that
the best-ﬁtting value for both sp and sm is 0.5, which is within the
range of values used in (Thompson, Brooks, & Hammett, 2006). The
other 3 parameters, s1; s2 and k, which in Thompson, Brooks, and
Hammett (2006) (who followed Perrone & Thiele (2002)) were
ﬁxed to 0.0072, 0.0043 (both in units of seconds) and 4 (dimen-
sionless), respectively, had to be changed for out data. In particular,
kwas set to 0.55 and the time constants was scaled by 4.9, yielding
0.0353 and 0.0211 for s1 and s2, respectively. With these parame-
ter values, the output of the ratio model is equal to the true
G. Sotiropoulos et al. / Vision Research 97 (2014) 16–23 21stimulus speed at all contrasts, except at low speeds (up to 2 deg/
s), where speed mildly decreases with contrast (Fig. 3.3, left panel).
By incorporating the ratio model of Thompson, Brooks, and
Hammett (2006) in the Bayesian model of Stocker and Simoncelli
(2006), we were able to provide a better description of our data
(Fig. 3.4), partially accounting for the interaction effect of speed
and contrast and yielding a 31% improvement in the ﬁts
ðR2 ¼ 0:85; SSE ¼ 0:243Þ. This is remarkable given that the number
of free parameters in the combined model is the same as in the
Bayesian model (namely 10). Note that treating the rest of the ratio
model parameters as free resulted in minimal further improve-
ment in ﬁts – too small to justify the increased model complexity.
It should also be noted that the ratio model on its own is not
able to account for our data, even if all of its parameters are free.
The main reason for this is that there is no set of parameter values
that results in a increase in perceived speed with increasing con-
trast, as is found in our data: up to a certain (low) stimulus speed,
which corresponds to the null point reported by Thompson,
Brooks, and Hammett (2006), the output of the ratio model (corre-
sponding to perceived speed) is an increasing function of contrast
but beyond that speed the model output is a decreasing or constant
function of contrast, across the entire parameter space. In the
Bayesian and combined models, however, perceived speed in-
creases with contrast across all stimulus speeds, as seen in our data
(Fig. 3.3).
The opposite effects that the ratio model and the prior of the
Bayesian model have on perceived speed at low stimulus speeds
(around 1 deg/s) are responsible for the improved performance of
the combined model. At high contrasts, the prior-induced decrease
in perceived speed is attenuated at low speeds due to the ratio
model, matching the data better (Fig. 3.4, right panel). This atten-
uation could not be provided solely by the prior because it would
have to apply to all contrast conditions and thus would not ﬁt
the data well.
The extracted priors under the combined model are quantita-
tively similar to those of the original Bayesian model, with the
exception of one subject (S1), whose prior is signiﬁcantly steeper
under the combined model (Fig. 3.5).4. Discussion
Qualitatively, our results replicate the majority of existing liter-
ature in ﬁnding that lower contrast decreases perceived speed in
all conditions tested. Only in one of the ﬁve subjects, at the highest
speed (12 deg/s) and only at the lowest contrasts (3% and 15%
Michelson contrast for the two gratings) tested was there an1 2 3 4 5
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Fig. 3.3. Output of the ratio model as a function of stimulus speed for the 3 contrast va
(ratio + Bayesian) model that best ﬁts the entire data. Inset shows the ratio model out
‘‘perceived speed’’ of the best-ﬁt Bayesian (middle panel) and combined (right panel) mo
perception.inversion of this relationship, although this did not reach
signiﬁcance.
When we quantitatively examine the data, however, we see
that at the lowest tested contrasts, CDB decreases as speed in-
creases (Fig. 2.1, leftmost panel): lowering contrast does not de-
crease perceived speed as much when speeds are high.
Interestingly, the situation is reversed at the highest tested con-
trasts (15% and 95% Michelson contrast) and CDB becomes more
prominent at high speeds.
Does, then, this differential effect of contrast at high speeds de-
pend on absolute contrast levels? Data from existing literature are
mixed. Among the studies that have shown evidence that decreas-
ing contrast increases perceived speed (Blakemore & Snowden,
1999; Hawken, Gegenfurtner, & Tang, 1994; Thompson, 1982;
Thompson, Brooks, & Hammett, 2006), only that of Hawken,
Gegenfurtner, and Tang (1994) used contrasts as low as the lowest
ones used in our study. In the other 3 studies, a reference grating of
either 25% (Thompson, 1982), 64% (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999)
or 70% (Thompson, Brooks, & Hammett, 2006) was matched
against test gratings of lower contrasts. Since these three studies
contradict our ﬁndings at comparable levels of contrast, a natural
question is: are there systematic differences in experimental
parameters (other than speed and contrast) between these 3 stud-
ies and the rest of the literature (including the present study) that
shows evidence of a decrease in perceived speed with decreasing
contrast?.
We suggest that temporal frequency is not such a parameter;
we used temporal frequencies at least as high as those used by
all studies that found an increase in perceived speed with de-
creased contrast (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999; Hawken, Gegen-
furtner, & Tang, 1994; Thompson, 1982; Thompson, Brooks, &
Hammett, 2006). If there were a ‘‘null point’’ in the temporal fre-
quency axis, our experiment ought to have hit it. Spatial frequency
is likely not a factor either – we used the same value as in one of
the conditions in Thompson, Brooks, and Hammett (2006) (2 cy-
cles/deg). The same holds for other stimulus parameters, such as
the type, location and drift direction of the gratings – all these
parameters were similar in conﬂicting studies.
Procedural differences are also unlikely to explain why we
failed to ﬁnd the null point. One possible factor could be the differ-
ent methods of determining the PSE. However, most studies uti-
lized staircase procedures, often very similar – e.g. Blakemore
and Snowden (1999) used the same maximum-likelihood-based
procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983) that we did. Another possible fac-
tor is the task design: the two gratings could be presented simul-
taneously or successively and there are reports that such
manipulations are important (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999; Stone3 4 5
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Fig. 3.4. Mean ratio of speeds of the high ðvHCÞ and low-contrast ðvLCÞ gratings at the point of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, separately for each
contrast condition. Points represent experimental data (as in Fig. 2.1); lines represent predictions of the ﬁtted combined (ratio + Bayesian) model. Color represents individual
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this article.)
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22 G. Sotiropoulos et al. / Vision Research 97 (2014) 16–23& Thompson, 1992); indeed, two of the studies that conﬂict with
ours used successive presentations (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999;
Thompson, Brooks, & Hammett, 2006). However, the other two
conﬂicting studies used simultaneous presentations (Hawken,
Gegenfurtner, & Tang, 1994; Thompson, 1982).
It is possible that biases and strategies not directly related to
speed perception have an effect, which may also be interactive
with the experimental design: certain biases/strategies may be
employed only on certain experimental setups. For example, when
subjects are highly uncertain about the relative speed of two grat-
ings, they may be inclined to pick the grating of the higher contrast
as being the faster one (because it is also the most salient). Similar
biases have been observed in 2-AFC experiments of orientation dis-
crimination (Eero Simoncelli, personal communication). Further-
more, differences in the way subjects are instructed to perform
the task may also play a role. For example, we have seen in our
lab that subjects sometimes differ in the strategies and response
biases they might use when dealing with uncertainty, even if the
experimental conditions are identical, and in some cases this was
due to subtle differences in instructions. There could also be a
‘‘threshold’’ effect of stimulus uncertainty: at very low contrasts
and high speeds (high uncertainty), subjects may switch to a
semi-random response strategy, for example by alternating ‘‘left’’
and ‘‘right’’ keypresses.
In regards to modeling, we have presented in this work a signif-
icantly faster model ﬁtting procedure than that used by Stockerand Simoncelli (2006); instead of using every trial of every stair-
case per condition, we used just the ﬁnal estimate of the staircase
plus the variability of this estimate across staircases. Effectively,
we ﬁt the model using just 1=Nth of the data, where N is the num-
ber of trials in a single staircase (40 in our case). Using an indepen-
dent large dataset (Berbec, 2013, see Appendix A.2), we compared
our ﬁtting method to that of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) and,
like them, we used the likelihood of the data under the best-ﬁtting
model as a performance metric, whereby 100% corresponds to the
likelihood of the data when separate Weibull functions for each
condition are ﬁt to it and 0% the likelihood under the random
(coin-ﬂipping) model. Over the entire dataset, the performance of
our ﬁtting method is 87%, compared to 93% of the method of Stock-
er and Simoncelli (2006). The extracted prior and likelihood com-
ponents were also very similar between the two methods.
Therefore our method can be useful during model selection/design,
allowing rapid iteration between ﬁtting and design, until a suitable
model is found, which can then be ﬁt with the method of Stocker
and Simoncelli (2006) for slightly more accurate quantitative pre-
dictions. Our method could also be used in cases where not every
trial of the staircase is available, such as when modeling data from
existing literature (where usually only the PSE is reported).
By incorporating the ratio model of Thompson, Brooks, and
Hammett (2006) (which in itself is unable to describe our data, also
see Fig. 3.3) as a pre-processing step in the Bayesian model of
Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), we were able to provide an
G. Sotiropoulos et al. / Vision Research 97 (2014) 16–23 23improved account of the interaction effect of contrast and speed.
However, this improvement is restricted to low speeds (around
1 deg/s), where an increase in contrast causes a mild decrease in
speed; there is no improvement at high speeds (around 12 deg/
s). The observed interaction could be better accounted for by a
model in which perceived speed (prior to the Bayesian computa-
tions) decreases with contrast at low speeds but increases with
contrast at high speeds. The simple ratio model of Thompson,
Brooks, and Hammett (2006) can only produce the former effect
– it cannot produce an increase in perceived speed with contrast
at high speeds. It would be interesting to examine whether an ex-
tended version of the ratio model, for example one that incorpo-
rates band-pass ﬁlters tuned to various temporal frequencies,
could better account for the interaction; this is left as future work.
We also note that, unlike the Bayesian model, the ratio model
seemingly constitutes a departure from a normative explanation
of speed perception. However, the ratio model was proposed, in
the form of the WIM model (Perrone & Thiele, 2002; Perrone,
2005), as a biologically plausible way of achieving variable speed
tuning in MT neurons by using a small number of V1 neurons
tuned not to speeds but to a limited range of spatial and temporal
frequencies. Thus, while the WIM model does not result in optimal
perception, it can be be argued that this is due to biological
constraints earlier in the visual hierarchy (V1) rather than an
inherent suboptimality in the model, in much the same way as
the Bayesian model is optimal under the assumption of noisy ear-
lier measurements.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2014.
01.012.
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